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Senior executives of critical national infrastructure facilities face competing requirements for investment
budgets. Whilst the impact of a cyber attack upon such utilities is potentially catastrophic, the risks to
continued operations from failing to upgrade ageing infrastructure, or not meeting mandated regulatory
regimes, are considered higher given the demonstrable impact of such circumstances. As cyber attacks on
critical national infrastructure remain low-frequency events, there is little to motivate business leaders to
increase their investment in cyber defences to comparable levels. This paper describes SCIPS, a gamified
environment in which senior executives experience the impact of a cyber attack on an electric power
generation plant, demonstrating how it can strategically affect shareholder value, and allows them to form
their own views on the relative importance of cyber security investment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A 2015 analysis of the impact of a malware
infection on the US national grid demonstrated
the potential for financial losses of between USD
243bn and USD 1trn. Despite such a compelling
example, investment in the cyber security of
industrial control systems (ICS) that underpin
electric power and other elements of critical
national infrastructure (CNI), remains low. This
is, in part, due to the levels of investment
required (Naedele (2007)) and the complexity of
defending proprietary technologies (Stouffer et al.
(2011)). In the case of electricity generation
it is also due to the competition for budgets
to support national power growth requirements,
maintain existing infrastructure, improve supply
reliability, and the transition to a smart grid
(Kaplan (2009), Haught and Paladino (2012)),
all of which generate a tangible return on
investment and promote shareholder value. In
contrast, expenditure to defend against ICS cyber
attacks, which the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) (NERC (2010)) characterised
as low-frequency events, does not demonstrate
any immediately measurable benefits. Given the
potentially catastrophic consequences of these high-
impact low-frequency (HILF) cyber events, how
do we raise the profile of security investment to
safeguard against the threat?
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) propose that safeguards
can be increased by raising awareness, arguing
that by knowing that there is the possibility of a
hazard, in this case a cyber attack, it poses less
risk than if we have no understanding of its potential
impact. In light of this, is it possible to create
a situation in which senior executives within CNI
organisations that operate ICS are presented with
a credible threat scenario in order to raise their
awareness and promote the prioritisation of cyber
security investment?
2. GAMIFICATION
To generate the circumstances under which senior
executives can experience the impact of a cyber
attack to raise their awareness of the issues, we
have ‘gamified’ a cyber incident, so that a series of
events can be played out in a safe environment
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that promotes self-learning. ‘Gamification’
is the process of using game mechanics and
structures as a means to engage players in
one or more problem-solving challenges, bound
by rules, interactivity and feedback, to elicit an
emotional reaction and result in a quantifiable
outcome (Zichermann and Linder (2010), Kapp
(2012)). Rieber (1996) highlights that games
motivate participants intrinsically, encouraging
them to draw their own conclusions as a result.
Wolfe (1997) similarly comments that game-
based approaches produce significant increases
in knowledge over conventional learning methods,
and promote motivation across different learning
styles, whilst Kapp (2012) emphasises how game
experiences can change a person’s real-life
perceptions.
Previous research into the gamification of cyber
security education has focused on developing
technical incident response skills rather than
attempts to shift the perceptions of non-technical
stakeholders impacted by such incidents
(Fink et al. (2013), Boopathi et al. (2015)). Elements
of response planning training by ENISA (2016)
includes attempts to quantify the costs associated
with cyber incidents, but does so at an operational
level on IT systems, with financial impacts that could
be mitigated through the purchase of insurance
policies (Vaughan and Vaughan (2013)) and
therefore potentially de-prioritised by an executive
of a CNI facility facing competing demands for
large-scale investment. In order to express the
issues of cyber attack on CNI to the game’s target
audience the scenarios must illustrate an effect
on the strategic viability of a critical infrastructure
business and articulate the impacts in a lexicon
familiar to C-level participants.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
To bound the scope and objectives of a gamified
environment, a set of five overall high-level
requirements were produced to guide the analysis
and development process:
1. Produce an educational game targeted at
high-level stakeholders to raise awareness of
the business-level impact of cyber security
incidents. The players will be assumed to have
minimal ICS or IT security knowledge, but
will understand the general objectives of a
business.
2. The game and its purpose should be
understandable in a reasonable amount of
time (15 mins) and should not require detailed
knowledge or previous experience.
3. The game should not follow a strict path and
should keep the players focused on a scenario
where there are no immediately apparent
winning solutions.
4. The game should encourage debate within a
team and promote competition between teams.
5. The game should allow the development of
new scenarios and gameplay options, so that it
can be repeated without significant re-working
of the components.
To ensure the game was continually reviewed
against its objectives it was decided it would be
implemented using an iterative approach, within
time-boxed development cycles, the first of which
would be three-months in duration.
4. GAME DESIGN OPTIONS
4.1. Game Play
For the game to appeal to the target audience
it was necessary to ensure that the nature
of the gameplay lent itself to the players and
the promotion of learning through self-discovery.
An initial investigation reviewed the gameplay activity
options defined by Kapp (2013):
Matching: In a matching game the player must
match one item with another.
Collecting/Capturing: Where the goal is to acquire
a certain number of objects. The player with the
largest collection wins.
Allocating Resources: The player is required
to balance the allocation of resources in order
to achieve a working equilibrium. There is no
competition with other players in this approach.
Strategising: A player allocates resources in a
similar manner to an ‘Allocating Resources’ game,
but is in competition with other players.
Building: Players try to create objects out of given
materials.
Puzzle Solving: Players are required to solve a
puzzle.
Exploring: Players interact with an environment
looking for objects of value.
Helping: Involves one player assisting another
player to accomplish a task.
Role Playing: The player assumes the role of
another person, with their responsibilities defined
within the confines of the game.
4.2. Game Medium
The medium of the game play was analysed against
the learning objectives and problem statement, again
using the definitions described by Kapp (2013):
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Board Game: A turn-based approach with players
moving around a pre-determined route through roles
of dice.
Role Playing: A board-less, dice-based model
where players interact with a facilitator who has a
predetermined number of options for the players to
explore.
Exercise: A scenario is presented with boundary
conditions in which players can manoeuvre freely.
Single Player PC Game: An automated
environment where players interact via a
programmed interface with an algorithmic opponent.
Multi-Player PC Game: Similar to the single-player
approach, but pitching player against player rather
than an algorithm.
4.3. Game Design Approach
The gameplay and medium were considered in
context together, resulting in the assessment matrix
shown in Table 1. Whilst subjective, the matrix
highlighted that role playing and exercises offered
the closest fit to providing a platform on which to
address the overall problem statement and learning
objective. The decision was taken to combine the
two approaches in an exercise format that requires
players to adopt leadership roles typical of a critical
infrastructure facility running ICS operations. In order
to derive a scenario under which a cyber attack on
a critical infrastructure facility would appear feasible,
it was decided to construct a fictitious sequence
of events based around UK foreign policy and
military intervention in a fictitious country that has
an indigenous offensive cyber capability (Wortzel
(2013), Libicki (2009)). The resulting game was
dubbed SCIPS, an acronym for “Simulated Critical
Infrastructure Protection Scenarios.”
5. PLAYER EXPERIENCE DESIGN PROCESS
To drive the gameplay through the player experience,
a seven-step gamification development process from
Burke (2014) was adopted. These steps, and the
decisions taken therein, are described below.
5.1. Outcomes and Success Metrics
In the process defined by Burke (2014), the intended
outcomes and measures of success must be defined
at the outset to ensure the subsequent design
steps adhere to the intentions of the game and the
gamification experience. As such, it was defined that
the intended outcome of playing the game would be
that participants realise that:
1. There are circumstances under which a cyber
attack could impact a CNI facility.
2. The drivers for the attack may come from
actions beyond their control.
Figure 1: The Player Design Experience Process
(Burke (2014))
3. Cyber attacks can have a direct impact on
share price and shareholder value.
4. Investment in cyber security before an attack
is the best way of preparing for this potential
situation.
As the intended outcomes are aimed at a change
in individual perceptions, the associated success
metrics must be subjective. A player feedback sheet
is completed at the end of the game that asks
nine key questions, all scored using a consistent
numeric range. The use of the feedback form
allows participants to measure the shift in their
understanding, and also to reinforce their changed
perceptions through positive affirmation (Cialdini
(2009)).
5.2. Target Audience
The game is intended for senior stakeholders
within CNI organisations. Typically these should be
participants who, during the course of their normal
working activities, would have to balance investment
decisions based on tangible outcomes and the
needs of the business and shareholders.
5.3. Player Goals
In the SCIPS game, players are required to make
a series of investment decisions based around
the maintenance of a CNI facility that operates
ICS equipment. In the initial version of the game
this is based around an electric power generation
plant. Subsequent implementations of the game are
planned to address other industries within the CNI
sector, supporting a broad spectrum of cyber-related
scenarios.
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Table 1: Game Options Assessment Matrix
Board Game Role Playing
(facilitated model)
Exercise Single Player PC
Game
Multi-Player PC
Game
Matching Gameplay did not
lend itself to self-
learning
Gameplay did not
lend itself to self-
learning
Gameplay did not
lend itself to self-
learning
Gameplay did not
lend itself to self-
learning
Gameplay did not
lend itself to self-
learning
Collecting/
Capturing
Gameplay was
too focused on a
predictable outcome
Gameplay was
too focused on a
predictable outcome
Gameplay was
too focused on a
predictable outcome
Gameplay was
too focused on
a predictable
outcome
Gameplay was not
viable in a head-
to-head player
environment
Allocating
Resources
Difficult to allow
players to allocate
resources in a fixed
board model
Viable: Players
could adopt a role,
but limiting the
playing time and
scope of decision
making could
prove difficult
Viable: Players
could face a given
scenario and
attempt to reach
equilibrium of
resources. However,
a non-competitive
environment
may not be
appropriate for
senior executives
Viable: Players
could face a
scenario, but
the algorithm-
based approach
without
other player
interaction
would limit
opportunities
for self-discovery
Viable: Players
could face a
scenario and
play head-to-
head. However,
the computer
environment
would require
game-playing
literate
competitors and
may stifle debate
Strategising Strategising on a
board game tends
to extend the time
required to play
Viable: Although
limiting the scope
of the decisions
available to
players may prove
challenging
Viable: Allows
for competitive
decision-making
in a limited
scenario. However,
constraining the
scope of the
decisions to those
appropriate to the
game may prove
challenging
The available
development
time would not
fit into the project
timescale
The available
development
time would not
fit into the project
timescale
Building Gameplay did
not lend itself to
problem statement
Gameplay did
not lend itself to
problem statement
Gameplay did not
lend itself to problem
statement
Gameplay did
not lend itself
to problem
statement
Gameplay did
not lend itself
to problem
statement
Puzzle
Solving
Gameplay lends
itself to reaching
a predetermined
outcome, which is
not appropriate
Gameplay lends
itself to reaching
a predetermined
outcome, which is
not appropriate
Gameplay lends
itself to reaching
a predetermined
outcome, which is
not appropriate
Gameplay lends
itself to reaching
a predetermined
outcome, which is
not appropriate
Gameplay lends
itself to reaching
a predetermined
outcome, which is
not appropriate
Exploring Gameplay did
not lend itself to
problem statement
Gameplay did
not lend itself to
problem statement
Gameplay did not
lend itself to problem
statement
Gameplay did
not lend itself
to problem
statement
Gameplay did
not lend itself
to problem
statement
Helping Gameplay did
not lend itself to
problem statement
Gameplay did
not lend itself to
problem statement
Gameplay did not
lend itself to problem
statement
Gameplay did
not lend itself
to problem
statement
Gameplay did
not lend itself
to problem
statement
Role
Playing
(assuming
a role or
persona)
Role playing on a
predefined board
game did not
appear feasible
Viable: Role
playing would limit
the scope of the
decisions available
to players, but
overall game scope
management
would be
challenging
Viable: Role playing
would limit the
scope of the
decisions available
to players, but
overall game scope
management would
be challenging
The available
development
time would not
fit into the project
timescale
The available
development
time would not
fit into the project
timescale
87
Using Gamification to Raise Awareness of Cyber Threats to Critical National Infrastructure
Cook • Smith • Maglaras • Janicke
Figure 2: SCIPS Player Goals
Players are required to balance the competing
priorities of shareholders and regulators with the
security requirements to defend against a credible
cyber threat. Each investment has a financial
impact with associated trade-offs, but can protect
revenues that result in maintained shareholder
value. Players of the game adopt one of five roles
within an organisation that operates a Combined
Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) electricity generation
plant. Their objective is to maximise shareholder
value, expressed as share value and anticipated
dividend per share. The winner is the team
with the highest share value, and the loser is
the CEO of the team with the lowest share
value.
The business objectives of the game are to meet,
as closely as possible, the investments stated
in their annual report and to maintain market
confidence. Figure 2 illustrates how the shared
goal of each team is to maximise the share
price, whilst individually, players try meet personal
goals by preserving their bonuses which are
impacted by the reallocation of funds within the
business.
The exception to this is the Security Director. To
create a player role who was more likely to champion
the required security investments it was decided
that the Security Director would have no bonus,
and therefore have no external influences on their
behaviours when considering the need for cyber
protection mechanisms.
5.4. Engagement Model
Burke (2014) describes the ways that games engage
with players in terms of positioning their gameplay in
the following spectrums:
Collaborative to Competitive: The balance by
which players are encouraged to adopt a ‘winner-
takes-all mentality’ versus a collegiate approach to
team success.
Intrinsic to Extrinsic: Defines how players
are rewarded for their successes in the
game.
Multiplayer to Solitary: The level to which players
interact with each other, if at all.
Campaign to Endless: Describes the boundaries
of the game, and whether it has a natural conclusion
or can continue indefinitely.
Emergent to Scripted: Determines whether the
outcome of the game is known, or evolves with the
gameplay.
Figure 3 illustrates the current SCIPS engagement
model, shown as black circles, and the extended
engagement model that will be implemented in later
versions of the game, as white.
The SCIPS game is essentially collaborative with
intra- and inter-team competitive elements that drive
debate between players about how to reallocate
budgets in order to mitigate the cyber threat.
Each round of the game is time constrained to
drive instinctive behaviours from the executives
participating (Menkes (2009)). A leader board is
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Figure 3: SCIPS Player Engagement Model
maintained throughout the game so that teams can
see where their share price sits in respect to other
teams.
Rewards within the game are intrinsic, focused
on maintaining the fictitious organisations’ financial
targets and the personal compensation packages of
the player roles within each team.
The game is multiplayer, with multiple players within
teams, and multiple teams. Players primarily interact
with the other members of their team, but are
influenced by the financial performance of the other
teams via the leader board.
The flow of the game follows a campaign that
models a series of incidents based on a typical cyber
attack ‘kill-chain’ (Hutchins et al. (2011)). Versions of
the game planned for later releases will support a
shift in gameplay towards an endless model based
on attacker-defender (National Research Council
(2010)) games that will support cyber warfare and
‘capture the flag’ functionality.
The current iteration of SCIPS is scripted to
provide a credible scenario that leads to the cyber
attacks. The initial version uses a US-UK coalition
intervention in an overseas conflict to underpin
the emerging cyber threat, and alternative scripted
scenarios are also under development following
a discussion between De Montfort University and
CERT-UK (2015). Additionally, later versions of the
game will support more emergent scenarios such as
attacker-defender models.
5.5. Play Space and Journey
5.5.1. Play Space
The play space of the game is based around a
game board, role cards, security cards, video feeds,
newspaper ‘cuttings’, a tablet player interface and an
overall leader board. All of the components of the
play space interact, using a mix of soft and hard
(physical) game play elements.
Game Board
The game board provides an illustration of a CCGT
power plant to set the scene for the players, and to
act as a focal point around which they can gather.
It provides placeholders for purchased security
cards to act as a quick reference for their increasing
defensive capabilities.
Role Cards
The role cards, picked at random by the players,
describe their responsibilities within the organisation
and their compensation packages.
Chief Executive Officer (CEO): Ultimately respon-
sible to the shareholders of the organisation and
likely to see the cyber threat as an ongoing risk, but
not an immediate priority that will affect the share
value of the business.
Chief Operating Officer (COO): Responsible for
the operations of the facility. The COO is likely to be
aware of the possibility of a cyber threat, but likely to
see the requirement for high availability and reliability
as a higher priority issue.
Compliance Director: In regulated markets the
Compliance Director will be responsible for ensuring
that all regulatory and legal mandates are met. The
role holder is not likely to focus on the cyber threat
unless it corresponds to a stated requirement.
Plant Director: Responsible for the day-to-day
operations of the facility and likely to report to the
COO. The plant director will have detailed knowledge
of the OT and the risk of any modifications or testing
on plant operations. However, the Plant Director is
also likely to be closer to the issues surrounding OT
and the reality of the cyber threat.
Security Director: Responsible for IT and OT
security and required to balance the management
of both, although is unlikely to have the mandate to
enforce changes on the operational environment.
Security Cards
The security cards within the game are configurable
depending upon the scenario adopted. The initial
version of the game uses the following:
External Firewalls: Protect the network perimeter
and will limit the deployment of malware.
Email Filters: Detects potential phishing attempts.
Anti-Virus: Up-to-date and regularly updated anti-
virus to contain attempts at malware propagation.
Intrusion Detection: Identifies abnormal behaviour
on your network and servers and alert your systems
administrators to potential malicious cyber activity.
Virtual Private Network: Securely extends the
network to trusted business partners, preventing
attackers from intercepting and manipulating data to
deploy malware.
Deep Packet Inspection: Monitors the traffic
flowing into and out of the network to identify
malicious activity.
Risk Assessment: A comprehensive analysis
of the threats to the business, their likelihood
and subsequent impact on operations to quantify
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the exposure the organisation has to service
disruption through security incidents, and to allow
the development of a qualified security plan.
Server Hardening: Disable all non-essential
services on servers that expose known security
vulnerabilities.
Patch Management: Initiates a programme to
determine the current patch levels required for
all devices and implement a pre-deployment
environment to test them, ensuring they will not
adversely affect operations.
Penetration Testing: Start an ongoing penetration
test regime to regularly test the environment for
security vulnerabilities.
Operational Technology (OT) De-Militarised
Zone (DMZ): Install a DMZ between the IT and OT
networks to minimise the risk of malware deployed in
the IT environment propagating to industrial control
systems.
Incident Response Process: Initiate an enterprise-
wide programme to analyse the cyber threats to the
business and develop plans to address them.
Segment IT Networks: Structure the IT networks of
the organisation so that traffic is limited to the areas
it needs to traverse, and limits the ability for malware
to route to wider systems.
Create an IT/OT Security Team: Pull together a
team of experienced professionals from both the IT
and OT domains in order to consider and defend the
organisations technology assets from cyber attack
in a coordinated, holistic manner.
Profile OT Traffic: Initiate a programme of OT traffic
capture and analysis so that intrusion detection
systems can be configured to recognise abnormal
activity on the OT network.
Limit User Account Permissions: Implement a
policy of enforcing the least privileges required for
each user account, so that users have access to the
information they require, thereby limiting the ability
of cyber attackers to access data and services.
Document Operational Processes: Produce
a comprehensive set of documents that define
the operational processes of the ICS systems
and the control equipment that underpins them
to determine which are critical to maintaining
operational capability, and determine measures to
mitigate the impact of their loss.
Limit External Accesses: Implement a processes
of continual review of external accesses to the
network so that connections are only permitted from
trusted partners and only allowed to exist for the
minimum time required.
Protect Designs: Identify all of the intellectual
property and documentation key to the operational
business and re-locate this to a repository where
access is limited and audited.
Segment OT Networks: Structure the OT networks,
buses and serial communications in a manner
whereby the ability to traverse from one device
or protocol to another can be limited, thereby
restricting the ability of malware to propagate to ICS
devices.
Configuration Management Processes: Introduce
a set of processes to ensure that the configuration of
all known devices is recorded, and any requests to
modify them are properly assessed prior to changes
being made.
Secure Operational Procedures: Implement a
complete review of all operations across IT, OT
and associated operations and develop policies
for all aspects of personnel, processes and use of
technology, then introduce programme of change to
establish their use.
Catalogue Assets: Implement a programme to
identify and catalogue all IT and OT assets within
the organisation so that they can be properly
managed.
Videos and Press Cuttings
At the beginning of each round a video is played
to the teams via their tablet interfaces. It presents
a simulated news broadcast that explains the initial
scenario that will subsequently develop as the
game progresses. The videos are supplemented
by newspaper cuttings that summarise the news
broadcasts so that players can refer back to salient
points.
Tablet Player Interface
The players within the teams interact with the game
and leader board through the tablet player interface.
In the example screenshot in Figure 4, a team
purchases security cards.
Figure 4: An example of the tablet player interface (De
Montfort University (2016))
Leader Board
The game also uses a leader board that interacts
with the tablet devices to display the financial
positions of each of the teams, providing a
comparative evaluation of their performance at the
end of each round.
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5.5.2. Journey
The journey that players experience through the
game starts at onboarding, then progresses through
the game rounds until the game close and the final
evaluation of its effectiveness.
Onboarding
Prior to commencing the game, connectivity
between the tablets and the leader board is
established. At the start of the session players are
introduced to the rules of the game by a facilitator.
In later versions of the game this step will be
automated and displayed on the tablet interface.
Members of each team then pick a role card at
random and enter their name against the role on the
tablet.
Game Rounds
The game currently comprises six rounds, each
representing a two-month period in a twelve-month
financial year from April to March. In each round
a new video broadcast is played to explain the
ongoing situation in the fictitious country. In the first
game scenario implemented, the players witness a
UK-US coalition that employs economic sanctions
and military intervention resulting in hacktivists from
the region threatening to retaliate against UK energy
infrastructure. The CEO of the fictitious company
starts with his individual bonus reduced to 80 percent
of its possible maximum value as a result of market
sentiment reducing the team’s company share price
by 10 percent in response to the threat. After
watching the video at the beginning of each round,
players have a limited amount of time to decide
which cyber security protection cards to purchase,
and which of their existing budgets to transfer
the funds from. Initially the scenario is baselined
with none of the security cards selected, and a
total investment budget available that is allocated
between infrastructure, regulatory and generation
upgrades. As the budgets are decremented, players
can immediately see the impact on their overall
share price and projected dividends to shareholders,
as well as their own personal bonus. As the
rounds progress, cyber incidents escalate from
initial reconnaissance activity to effects against
the energy production capabilities of the power
plant, the impact of which can be limited by the
purchase of security cards in previous rounds.
Each of the security cards has four values
assigned to it, used in the calculations regarding its
impact:
1. Active?: This determines if the security card
is active, based on the difference between its
date of purchase and the current date, and the
implementation timescale associated with the
functionality.
2. Protection: Defines the maximum level of
protection afforded by the security card.
3. Potential Impact: Defines the maximum impact
that a cyber attack will have if that card is
not purchased. This is defined as a numeric
value and may be higher than the maximum
Protection figure. This is to allow for realistic
scenarios such as firewalls not detecting all
attacks.
4. Actual Impact: If the security card is not active
then this defaults to the Potential Impact figure,
however if it is active then the value is set to the
difference between the Potential Impact and
Protection variables.
The Protection and Potential Impact figures change
from round to round, as certain security cards afford
better protection against each of the stages of
the cyber attack. For instance, the Traffic Profiling
security card in round 1 has no impact on preventing
external IP network reconnaissance of the IT
systems, whereas in subsequent rounds it offers the
ability to detect traffic abnormalities in the OT space.
The sum of all Actual Impacts of all of the security
cards is calculated and a percentage presented
back to the players to indicate how much, or little,
their infrastructure was protected, as does a textual
description of the impact. In later rounds of the first
version of SCIPS, the summations of the Actual
Impacts is divided by an impact factor to feed into
the cumulative impact of attacks that reduces share
price and impacts personal bonus figures.
Game Close: At the close of the game the players
will have experienced the impacts of a cyber attack
on the ICS in their power generation plant, the extent
of which will have been limited, or not, by their cyber
security investments. The leader board will display
the overall performance of the teams, presenting the
team with the highest share value as the winners,
and the player in the role of CEO of the team with
the lowest share price as the loser.
Evaluation: The purpose of the game is to change
the perceptions of senior stakeholders in CNI organ-
isations who possibly perceive investment in cyber
security as an ongoing line on an IT budget that
should be contained, to a strategic, top-line invest-
ment that protects shareholder value. Throughout
the game, players develop their understanding of
the impact of a well-executed cyber attack and form
their own opinions as to the necessity of planned,
defensive measures deployed in advance of such
an incident. As players will come to the game with
differing levels of experience and understanding of
ICS and CNI, it is necessary to identify any shift in
their views in order to evaluate the effectiveness of
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the gamification. Players are encouraged to com-
plete a feedback form that establishes their initial
perceptions and measures any shifts in view as a
consequence of the game. The questions asked
include:
1. Before playing that game, what level of
understanding of industrial control systems did
you have?
2. Before playing the game did you consider the
cyber security of industrial control systems to
be a strategic issue?
3. The game presented players with a set
of competing choices between corporate
investment and personal bonus compensation.
Do you consider that this was a realistic
situation?
4. The game presented a cyber attack as a
consequence of national foreign policy and use
of military power overseas. Do you consider
this to be a realistic scenario?
5. The security cards offered players the ability
to increase specific areas of security, with
associated costs and implementation
timescales. Did the cards allow you consider
the breadth of possible security investment?
6. Was the time taken to play the game
appropriate?
7. Did you enjoy the game?
8. After playing the game do you agree that
industrial control system cyber security is a
strategic issue?
9. Did the game meet its objectives?
5.6. Game Economy
At the start of the game the players are presented
with the investment budgets committed to in their
fictitious company’s annual report. These include
provisions for upgrades to physical infrastructure,
regulatory compliance, and power generation equip-
ment. No provision was made for increased cyber
security in their plans for the forthcoming financial
year. To purchase security cards to protect their in-
frastructure, players must decrement these budgets
to fund their investments. A reduction in committed
inward investment results in the overall share price
falling. Overall market sentiment (Kahn (2010)) is
reflected in an initial 10 per cent fall in share price
as a result of the threats by hacktivists, with fur-
ther changes to market confidence as a result of
investment decisions and public awareness of cyber
attacks. Whilst trying to preserve the share price,
players also try to maintain their personal bonus,
which is also impacted by investment decisions, re-
sulting in a tension between corporate and personal
value.
5.7. Play, Test and Iterate
The game was initially implemented as a proof-
of-concept demonstrator at De Montfort University
(DMU) on 15th May 2015 to an audience of MSc
students with no ICS or CNI experience. The player
interface logic was modelled in a spreadsheet to
allow for cross-variable relationships to be revised
within short timescales if necessary. The aim of the
initial game session was to identify any flaws in
the logic or gameplay before presenting the concept
to a senior audience. A revised version of the
demonstrator was presented at Imperial College,
London on 29th June 2015, attended by members
of the Research Institute into Trustworthy Industrial
Control Systems (RITICS), and a senior audience
from government and industry. The feedback from
the session was positive, although as the assembled
audience were all involved in the cyber security of
ICS there were no significant shifts in the perception
of the importance of ICS cyber security. Following
the presentation at Imperial College, DMU were
invited to meet with CERT-UK 27th November 2015
to discuss new scenarios that could be developed in
line with perceived threats to UK CNI.
The player interface is now under redevelopment as
a tablet application, along with a more flexible game
definition framework that allows new scenarios to be
defined as configuration files. Support for team and
player interactivity has also been improved so that
later versions will allow attacker-defender models
and ‘capture the flag’ competitions that will integrate
with the DMU ‘CYRAN’ cyber range.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Gamification is a proven method to change the
perceptions and behaviours of players. Hamari
et al. (2014), in a review of empirical studies
on gamification, highlighted the positive effects it
provides, but cautioned that its impact is highly
dependent upon the context of the scenarios used
and the backgrounds of the players involved. SCIPS
has demonstrated its potential to influence a senior
audience and present a plausible narrative in which
a serious threat to UK CNI might emerge, articulating
the impact in a language and economy familiar
to business leaders. Further research is required
to assess the impact of SCIPS across a broader
range of audiences with differing levels of experience
in strategic decision-making. This perspective is
echoed by Stott and Neustaedter (2013) who point
out that for gamification to be effective it must provide
a realistic context for the players.
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However, by presenting the players with the
opposing requirements of maintaining share value
whilst investing in cyber security, and preserving
personal bonuses, players with and without strategic
management experience have been observed to
engage in detailed discussions about the priority
of security investment versus the perceived cyber
threat, and its context within the protection of
shareholder value. As a result, SCIPS has met its
objective of raising the profile of cyber security within
ICS, and warrants further development to increase
its range of impact.
7. FUTURE DIRECTION
SCIPS forms an essential element of ongoing DMU
research into mitigating the risk of cyber attacks
on ICS and CNI through the use of synthetic
environments. The game’s future direction will be
guided by the strategic risk models developed
as a consequence of this research, focusing on
enterprise impact. The gameplay options will be
extended to allow for greater interaction between
teams and players, and include support for remote
player options. However, as the game is intended
to assist in changing the perceptions of senior
executives, the game play will remain focused on
providing the evidence necessary for its target
audience to justify strategic investment in cyber
security.
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